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The Moral Position of Landowners 
Within the Scope of CERCLA 
Hundreds of years from now, when history students are 
looking into the past of America, it might appear that the Unit-
ed States government woke up one morning to discover that its 
country was on the verge of becoming a vast wasteland. View-
ing the great mass of hazardous waste problems throughout 
the country, Congress hastily enacted the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA). 1 Part and parcel to CERCLA was the creation of 
the Superfund. 2 The idea was that if a problem were too great, 
and threatened the public health and well being, then no time 
should be wasted. The government would stop the problem and 
clean it up, spending the monies of the Superfund. Mterwards, 
the government would seek out those responsible to take on the 
economic burden of the clean-up. 
Congress left great gaps in CERCLA which were left for 
the courts to fill. In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by codi-
fying much of what the courts had done in gap-filling with the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
(SARA).3 SARA amends, clarifies, and reauthorizes the origi-
nal CERCLA statute while replenishing and increasing the 
Superfund. 
Under CERCLA, liability is assigned to all potentially 
responsible parties (PRPs).4 Landowners who are potentially 
liable find that the exceptions to CERCLA are few and that the 
price of liability is great. Therefore, landowners have sought 
vigorously to come within the narrow defenses allowed under 
CERCLA. As a result, the defenses possible under CERCLA 
have become quite distinct through the refining fire of litiga-
1. As amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
2. The Superfund is simply a cash reserve which the USEPA may use to 
clean up hazardous waste sites which endanger the public. Congress intended 
initially that the Superfund would entail $ 1.5 billion and last five years. As of 
this writing, estimated costs that the actual clean ups which will be required 
under CERCLA using the Superfund will range between $ 750 billion and $ 1 tril-
lion, and take 30 years to clean up, if as much contamination exists as some fear. 
Milton Russel, Wasteful Waste Disposal?, WASH. Posr, Mar. 20, 1992, at A25. 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988). 
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tion and appellate review. 
For landowners, there is the possibility of showing that 
they fit into the "innocent landowner" exception.5 The land-
owner can also try to escape liability by contracting with the 
lessee for full and total indemnification. Both of these possibili-
ties carry great risk because they are asserted after the clean-
up when the government is seeking indemnification. If the 
landowner loses, he may liable for a large damage award. A 
back door is open to the landowner in that he may attempt to 
settle with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a 
relatively small amount in a de minimis settlement. 
However, all of these possibilities can be cut off if the court 
finds the slightest degree of fault by commission or omission on 
the part of the landowner.6 Although CERCLA is recognized as 
a strict liability statute, courts continue to look to equitable 
factors of fault when they actually apportion liability in contri-
bution actions. 7 Even if the landowner was not actually pro-
ducing any of the waste, however, the picture can still appear 
ominous, considering that courts in many cases are declaring 
the parties as jointly and severally liable regardless of relative 
causation. 8 
Landowners have reason for concern because courts have 
been scrupulously examining the landowner's position in defin-
ing when a landowner may be held liable. In a recent case, 
United States v. R. W. Meyer, Inc.,9 the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 
district court decision which found liability based on the moral 
position of the landowner. The moral position standard, simply 
stated, is that a landowner has an inherently higher moral 
duty to society to remain informed of all activities which are 
conducted on his land. The presumed better ability of landown-
ers to monitor potential problems makes them better able to 
circumvent potential hazardous waste problems. 
This paper will explore the impact and implications of this 
decision by examining the moral position standard under 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988), discussed in further detail infra. 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(6) (1988) (a bar against liability exists only where a PRP 
can show that the damages caused by the release or threat of release "were caused 
solely by" one of the enumerated defenses). ld. 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(1)(1) (1988). 
8. See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Monsato Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); Mardan Corp. v. 
C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). 
9. 932 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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CERCLA as it applies to landowners. The facts and decision of 
Meyer will be used in Part I as a backdrop for comparing and 
analysing the application of this standard. Part II will examine 
the general purpose and struicture of CERCLA as well as the 
tools available to the EPA to implement it. Part III will discuss 
whether the moral position standard achieves the purposes of 
CERCLA, what impact this will have on landowners, and how 
exposure to liability can be reduced. 
!. UNITED STATES V. R. W. MEYER 
Procedurally, the appeal in Meyer arose at the latest stage 
possible. The clean-up had already occurred and the court had 
identified the PRPs. The party who had assumed the burden of 
"fronting" the costs of the remedial action was pursuing all 
PRPs to get contribution. 
A. Facts of United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc. 
R.W. Meyer (Meyer) owned property in Cadillac, Michigan, 
and, like any reasonable landowner, wished to make some 
money from his investment. In 1972, Meyer entered into a 10-
year lease with Northernaire Plating Company (Northernaire) 
to operate a metal electroplating business on Meyer's property. 
Willard S. Garwood was the president and sole shareholder of 
Northernaire and managed the day-to-day operations of the 
company. In mid-1981 all the assets of Northernaire were sold 
to Toplocker Enterprises, Inc. (Toplocker). 10 
In March of 1983, officials from the Michigan Department 
of Natural Resources and the federal EPA examined the prop-
erty. It had been reported that a child had received burns while 
playing on the property. When the soil, sludge, and drums 
containing a vast array of materials on the property were test-
ed, substantial amounts of caustic and corrosive materials were 
found. 11 Specifically, the EPA noted that they observed cya-
nide filled drums and tanks haphazardly strewn about the 
property outside the facility. 12 Officials also determined that 
Nothernaire discharged materials into a catch basin where it 
leaked into the local sewage system. 13 
10. ld. at 569. 
11. ld. at 570. 
12. ld. 
13. ld. 
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Although the facts of this case are frightening, they are, in 
actuality, no worse than many of the environmental problems 
which can be found en masse throughout the country. 14 Since 
the problem at the facility was continuing and threatened pub-
lic welfare, the EPA conducted an "Immediate Removal Ac-
tion."15 Mter taking this remedial action and cleaning up the 
site, the United States commenced an action to recover the 
costs of clean-up paid out of the Superfund. 
The district court found the harm indivisible, and there-
fore, found all the defendants jointly and severally liable. 16 
Alof the defendants then brought cross-claims for contribution 
against each other, which claims were all granted summary 
judgment. 17 The summary judgment rulings are at issue as 
they involved the final allocation of costs. Interestingly, in the 
allocation of costs, the trial court assigned two-thirds of the 
total clean-up costs to Northernaire and its principal share-
holder Garwood, but assigned an entire one-third portion, or 
$114,274.41 to the landowner. 18 The assignment of this share 
was the focus of the Sixth Circuit's opinion, and this comment 
will focus on this allocation as well. 
B. Analysis of the Court in Meyer 
The trial court founded its apportionment of contribution 
on several frequently cited factors: 19 
(1) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contri-
bution to a discharge release or disposal of a hazardous waste 
can be distinguished; 
(2) the amount of the hazardous waste involved; 
(3) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved; 
(4) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, 
14. There are presently approximately 1,200 "priority sites" throughout the 
United States with problems similar to those in Meyer. Robert Harris, Hazardous 
Wastes, Superfund and Toxic Substances, C667 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 55 (1991). 
15. !d. at 569. 
16. See United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. 
Mich. 1987). Liability was founded on Section 107(a) of CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 
9607(a)). 
17. !d. 
18. Meyer had "generously" offered to pay the EPA $1,709.03. 932 F.2d at 571. 
In some cases such an amount would likely be appropriate as a de minimis settle-
ment. See infra text accompanying note 88. 
19. Northernaire, 670 F. Supp. at 742. As this paper is focusing on the con-
tribution issues, the exact grounds for finding Meyer generally liable are not 
discussed. 
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transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazard-
ous waste; 
(5) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to 
the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the char-
acteristics of such hazardous waste; and 
(6) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, 
State, or local officials to prevent any harm to the public 
health or the environment.20 
347 
While recognizing that the lessee was the primary contributor, 
the court nonetheless apportioned to the lessor, Meyer, one 
third of the liability. This was based primarily on two factors: 
first, the court found that Meyer had not done his utmost in 
cooperating with the EPA and state officials, and second, the 
court did not believe that Meyer, as the owner of the site, had 
exercised an acceptable degree of care as the landowner with 
respect to the hazardous waste. In addition, Meyer had alleged-
ly constructed the sewer line on the property negligently.21 
The court further found, that in light of the amount of hazard-
ous waste released and the extreme toxicity of the waste in-
volved, the regulations and standards of CERCLA should be 
strictly applied. 22 
The section of SARA which illuminates contribution ac-
tions, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(£)(1) (1988) states: "In resolving contri-
bution claims, the court may allocate response costs among 
liable parties using such equitable factors as the court deter-
mines are appropriate." The trial court also announced that it 
took into consideration Meyer's moral contribution as the own-
er of the site.23 Meyer had attempted to elude liability by ar-
guing that he could not be shown to have caused any of the 
harm, except perhaps as to the existence of the sewer line.24 
Meyer maintained that his contribution to the release of haz-
ardous materials was negligible.25 But the court's adoption of 
a moral position standard, which the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
20. See 932 F.2d at 571 citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F. Supp. 78, 86 
(D.Me. 1988), affd sub nom. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629 
(1st Cir. 1989); United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249 
(S.D.III. 1984); H.R. REP. No. 253(III), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, (1985), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 3038, 3042. 
21. Meyer, 932 F.2d at 571. 
22. ld. at 571-74. 
23. ld. at 573. 
24. ld. 
25. ld. 
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completely rejected any such arguments. An analysis of the 
general aims of CERCLA is necessary in order to understand 
the import of the moral position standard. 
II. STRUCTURE OF CERCLA 
Uncontrolled toxic dumps and storage of hazardous materi-
als constitute a major threat to millions of people throughout 
the United States.26 Congress stated that CERCLA was enact-
ed in 1980 to confront, "[t]he legacy of past haphazard disposal 
or chemical wastes and the continuing danger of spills or other 
releases of dangerous chemicals."27 In order to further protect 
public health and safety and to preserve the environment, Con-
gress promulgated CERCLA and SARA.28 The provisions of 
the 1980 CERCLA statute make up the nucleus of the federal 
response to difficulties connected with cleaning up contami-
nated lands. 
The 1986 SARA amendments clarify and reauthorize 
CERCLA.29 Recognizing that time is the most critical element 
in a hazardous waste clean-up, Congress sought out measures 
which would allow the government to clean up the problem 
now and ask questions later. 30 Specifically, Congress wanted 
to give the EPA a strong oversight role with "tough legal en-
forcement standards."31 
A. Tools Available to the EPA under CERCLA 
CERCLA effectively gave the Executive branch of the gov-
ernment, or the agency administering the statute, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the tools necessary to fulfill this 
mission. CERCLA authorizes the President to take any action 
he "deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or 
26. See infra note 2. 
27. SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PuB. WORKS, ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE ACT, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), reprinted in 1 
Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980 at 477 (1983). 
28. Ascon v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1989). 
29. Thus the SARA amendments have become one within CERCLA, and this 
comment will be referring to the whole statutory scheme simply as CERCLA. 
30. SARA "has been written with the underlying belief that Congress should 
focus on ways to ensure rapid and thorough cleanup of abandoned hazardous 
wastes .... " H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3,55 (1985), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837. 
31. ld. 
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the environment."32 The President is instructed to seek out 
both known and threatened releases of hazardous pollutants, 
substances, or contaminants.33 Congress created a fund which 
the President, through the EPA could draw on to clean up the 
wastes.34 Thus, the Superfund was created to combat prob-
lems which the EPA found to pose a serious risk to either the 
public or the environment.35 
The Superfund money will be completely allocated to this 
clean up response unless the EPA can find a solvent liable 
party.36 When the EPA can find a responsible party, then the 
government must seek an injunction or issue an administrative 
order to force the responsible parties to pay for the costs.37 
When the hazardous waste problem is seen as an imminent 
danger, for example, when the waste continues to seep through 
the ground or flow into a public sewer, then the EPA simply 
cleans up the mess and then goes hunting for PRPs.38 There 
are two actions available to the EPA are two: (1) short-term 
"removal" actions/9 and (2) long-term "remedial" efforts.40 
Section 9607(a) of CERCLA places liability for the clean-up 
on four different groups: (1) individuals who owned the proper-
ty at the time the taxies were released, (2) individuals who ac-
cept hazardous waste for transportation, disposal, or treatment, 
(3) individuals who arranged for disposal of hazardous sub-
stances by contract or otherwise, and (4) the current landown-
ers.41 For the purposes of administrative ease and reduction of 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988). 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1988). 
34. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988). 
35. ld. 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
37. ld. Congress could plainly see that it could not finance the entire clean-up 
of America, and hence, anytime the money can be recovered, it must be sought. 
See Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1445 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
38. See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986); 
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1985). 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988) (i.e., cleaning up spilled substances before they 
have contaminated the entire area, or building an impoundment wall). 
40. ld. § 9601(24) (i.e., relocation of displaced residents, dredging, repairing 
leaking containers). 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) states in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to 
the defense set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of ... a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance 
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were 
disposed of, 
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litigation costs, the EPA often seeks to recover these costs only 
from the current landowner.42 
B. Strict Liability under CERCLA 
Although the Superfund exists to finance the clean up of 
hazardous wastes, courts construing CERCLA often impose 
strict liability upon all responsible parties so that all the mon-
ies expended from the Superfund can be recouped.43 CERCLA 
does not contain express language demanding the imposition of 
strict liability. However, the Second Circuit in New York v. 
Shore Realty Corp.44 stated that CERCLA section 9607(a)(l) 
"unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a 
facility from which there is a release or threat of release, with-
out regard to causation."45 Therefore, the simple ownership of 
land can, in some instances, be the key to the allocation of 
large portions of liability. 
Such an allocation follows Congress' intent. The legislative 
history shows that Congress established a strict liability stan-
dard under CERCLA based on its conclusion that anyone who 
engages in any activity connected with hazardous substances is 
involved in an abnormally dangerous activity.46 Negligence, 
causation, and fairness are not elements of responsibility under 
CERCLA. As already stated, since the current owner is easily 
found and often solvent, the EPA frequently seeks a recovery of 
the Superfund allocations from him. 
C. Joint I Several Liability under CERCLA 
Responsible parties are regularly held jointly and severally 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for 
disposal or treatment . . . of hazardous substances owned or possessed by 
such person, by any other party or entity . . . and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for 
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites 
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened 
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of hazardous sub-
stance, shall be liable for [all costs incurred]. 
42. See, e.g., Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. 
Okla. 1987). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) ("[PRPs] shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal 
or remedial action incurred by the United States .... "). 
44. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). 
45. ld. at 1044. 
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988); S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
13,33-34 (1980) (Hazardous substance is a term which is defined by the USEPA)" 
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liable since it is difficult to prove that the harm is divisible.47 
Often materials combine to create new hazardous substances so 
that any tracing is impractical if not impossible. ''The practical 
effect of placing the burden on defendants has been that re-
sponsible parties rarely escape joint and several liabili-
ty .... "48 Some courts have felt that the time consuming task 
of tracing waste to allocate liability would ignore Congress' 
concern that the clean-up efforts proceed quickly.49 These 
courts have held that differentiation of substantial versus trivi-
al causation should not be used in CERCLA litigation.5° For 
this reason, even landowners who have only remote contact 
with their lands can potentially be held completely responsible 
for the entire clean-up costs. In the initial allocation of liability, 
there is no place for comparative causation. 
D. Defenses to CERCLA Liability 
CERCLA section 9607(a), which assigns liability, specifi-
cally states that it is subject only to the defenses defined in 
subsection (b) of section 9607.51 The enumerated defenses are: 
(1) an act of God, (2) an act of war, and (3) the "innocent land-
owner" defense.52 The innocent landowner defense states in 
pertinent part: 
[There is no liability where the defendant can establish that 
the release was caused by] an act or omission of a third party 
other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one 
whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual 
relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defen-
dant ... if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of 
the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the 
hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the 
characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all 
relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions 
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party 
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 n.l3. See also 
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988); United States 
v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
48. O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989). 
49. !d. at 179 n.4. 
50. !d. 
51. See supra note 30. 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). 
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acts or omissions .... 53 
Section 9607(b)(3) must be read with section 9601(35) if the 
owner has taken title subsequent to the release. 54 
The innocent landowner defense is the most commonly 
invoked defense,55 and to successfully raise the defense the 
defendant must prove all the elements of section 9607(b)(3). 
Such a standard is hard for any landowner to prove, and as 
will be shown, the moral position which the Sixth Circuit an-
nounced potentially makes asserting this defense even harder. 
The landowner may be held liable for the acts of his ten-
ants. 56 Courts have also considered the tenants to be "owners" 
under CERCLA. 57 These same courts have concluded that 
both the tenant and the landowner together are to be consid-
ered owners under CERCLA section 9607(a). The landowner 
cannot invoke the innocent landowner defense unless he can 
show that he undertook "all appropriate inquiry into the previ-
ous ownership and uses of property consistent with good com-
mercial or customary practice."58 What constitutes appropriate 
inquiry is a question of fact which must now be interpreted in 
light of the moral position standard. 
E. Contribution Actions Under CERCLA 
Often it is the current landowner who is sought out for 
contribution by the EPA. But any party, such as a possessory 
tenant, who is found liable can spread the liability among all 
PRPs through a contribution action. 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988). 
54. Under § 9601(35) the buyer must still show that he had no knowledge of 
the hazardous substance and he must also show that he used due diligence in 
attempting to make sure that there was no hazardous substance on the property. 
See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). 
55. Claims of act of God and act of war are rarely successful as they are hard 
to prove. For either defense, the defendant would have to show that it contributed 
in no way to the cause of the problem. As the simple storage of materials or the 
leasing to one who stores hazardous materials can be seen as a causative connec-
tion, especially under the moral position standard, these defenses are useless to 
most landowners. 
56. See United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,616 
(D.N.M. May 4, 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 
653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984). 
57. South Carolina Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 1003. 
58. United States v. Serafini, 711 F. Supp. 197, 198 (M.D. Pa. 1988). See also 
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B)(West Supp. 1989). 
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Any person may seek contribution from any other person who 
is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this 
title, during or following any civil action under section 9606 of 
this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims 
shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Feder-
al law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allo-
cate response costs among liable parties using such equitable 
factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in 
this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring 
an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action un-
der section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title. 59 
This section was added through the SARA amendments. Prior 
to the SARA Amendments, the federal courts applied an equi-
table analysis and come to the same conclusions. 60 Section 
9613(f) is, therefore, simply a codification of the federal com-
mon law which developed prior to the SARA amendments both 
in applying joint and several liability and allowing contribu-
tions against other liable parties. 61 
For landowners, or anyone caught up in a contribution 
action, a threshold question becomes what factors the court will 
consider as appropriate equitable factors. The House Judiciary 
Committee, which drafted language similar to section 9613(f), 
explained that a court could consider anything it felt relevant 
and enumerated the following possible considerations: 
[T]he amount of hazardous substances involved;the degree of 
toxicity or hazard of the materialsinvolved; the degree of 
involvement by parties in the generation, transportation, 
treatment, storage, or disposal of the substances; the degree 
of care exercised by the parties with respect to the substances 
involved; the degree of cooperation of the parties with govern-
ment officials to prevent any harm to public health or the 
en vir on ment. 62 
A court is not substantially limited in what it may consider 
because its determinations and conclusions have their basis in 
equity. Years ago the Supreme Court announced that: "The 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1988) (emphasis added). 
60. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
61. ld. 
62. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3,55 (1985) reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3042. 
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essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chan-
cellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities 
of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has dis-
tinguished it."63 In CERCLA litigation, the public interests in 
having the Superfund replenished, guarding the public health, 
and providing an effective deterrent are seen as central to any 
apportionment decisions. "The hallmark of a court of equity is 
its ability to frame its decree to effect a balancing of all the 
equities and to protect the interests of all affected by it, includ-
ing the public."64 
The legislative history of section 9613(0 exhibits Congress' 
intent that a court adjudicating a contribution action should 
evaluate moral as well as legal considerations in the apportion-
ment. This is because the statute requires the court to not look 
exclusively to traditional equitable factors, but instead to "such 
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate."65 
The latitude given under the statute is, therefore, extremely 
broad because the court's determination regarding equitable 
factors can only be reviewed under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard.66 Since the lists of factors provided by the legislature 
and the cases interpreting the statute are only guidelines, the 
cited factors for apportionment are in no way exhaustive. As in 
the traditional application of equity, the court will look closely 
at the facts of each case. 
In a restitutionary approach to contribution some courts 
have looked at the benefits received by the parties as well as 
the knowledge or acquiescence of the parties in the contaminat-
ing activities when apportioning liability.67 In this regard, 
landowners can receive larger apportionments based on the 
knowledge, whether actual or constructive, of the nature of 
their tenant's business. The collection of rent, therefore, carries 
with it the obligation, in the eyes of some courts, to become 
knowledgeable concerning the actions of a tenant who possess-
es the land in question. 
In prior adjudications of contribution actions under section 
63. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)(citations omitted). 
64. Kay v. Mills, 490 F. Supp. 844, 855 (E.D.Ky. 1980) (citing W. DeFuniak, 
HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 25 (1956)). 
65. 42 u.s.c. § 9613(0(1) (1988). 
66. Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 304, 308 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988). 
67. South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Montalvo, No. 88-8038, 1989 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17555 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 1989). 
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9613(f) have shown that the courts are generally most con-
cerned with achieving the purposes of CERCLA and replen-
ishing the Superfund. Therefore, a court in its consideration of 
equitable factors might "consider the state of mind of the par-
ties, their economic status, any contracts between them bearing 
on the subject, and any traditional equitable factors deemed ap-
propriate as mitigating factors .... "68 The expandable nature 
of this provision was intended by the legislature. As the legisla-
tive history of section 9613(£) states, "contribution claims will 
be resolved pursuant to Federal common law."69 
As the court in Meyer stated, traditional defenses in equity 
will only be seen as mitigating factors. Such traditional defens-
es as unclean hands, laches, caveat emptor, waiver, unjust en-
richment, and estoppel have no place in CERCLA liability allo-
cation. 7° Courts are especially adverse to allowing defendants 
in contribution actions to escape liability under such equitable 
defenses since spreading the costs of a clean up will more likely 
replenish the Superfund. 71 
For instance, courts have elaborated as to why the doctrine 
of unclean hands is an inapplicable bar to a contribution action. 
First, the statutory language itself sets no limit as to who 
among the PRPs may be brought into a contribution action. 
Section 9613(£) authorizes "any party" to recover response costs 
from "any other person who is liable." Second, since contribu-
tion actions apply to PRPs, all the parties involved have un-
clean hands by definition, and to allow a party to assert the 
equitable defense of unclean hands would emasculate section 
9613(£). The relative "cleanliness" of the parties' hands can 
have an effect on the determination made by the court, but 
there can be no bar to recovery based on this equitable defense. 
Many of the other equitable defenses have not been litigat-
ed, but there is no reason to believe that a court would allow 
them as a bar to recovery in any instance. A contribution action 
simply signifies that the EPA chose one or two PRPs, usually 
68. United States v. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1991). 
69. H.R. REP. No. 253(I) (Energy & Commerce Committee), 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 80 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862; see also H.R. REP. No. 
253(III) (Judiciary Committee), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1985), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3042. 
70. Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D.N.J. 1988) 
(equitable defenses apply to damages only as mitigating factors). 
71. Invoking the statute of limitations against a contribution action is viable as 
it is provided for in CERCLA itself. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (1988). 
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those with the deepest pockets, to initially clean up the site. 
This leaves the splitting of hairs to contributions actions. Such 
a formulation meets the needs of CERCLA in that the often 
slow process of apportionment takes place after the threat to 
the public has been obviated. 
The language of CERCLA's contribution section "reveals 
Congress' concern that the relative culpability of each respon-
sible party be considered in determining the proportionate 
share of cost each must bear." Numerous courts have applied a 
scheme of applied comparative negligence principles within the 
strict liability structure of CERCLA. The legislative history 
exhibits that Congress intended the contribution section to 
"encourage quicker, more equitable settlements, decrease litiga-
tion and thus facilitate cleanups." While the threat of contribu-
tion may in fact facilitate settlement and private clean-up ac-
tions, it will probably not cut down on litigation at all. Since 
the amounts of liability in most CERCLA actions are so great, 
settlement is often impossible with parties who are attempting 
to elude all liability. Therefore, litigation in many cases will 
only be increased. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes two ap-
proaches to apportionment: ( 1) pro rata, and (2) comparative 
contribution. Under the pro rata method shares are divided 
up equally. This would present a windfall for large corporations 
since large shares could be assumed by small entities or indi-
viduals with few assets who actually contributed little to the 
problem. Therefore, courts generally do not apportion contribu-
tion on the pro rata basis. Courts have noted that pro rata 
apportionment would not fulfill Congress' intent that appor-
tionment be fair. 
Under the comparative causation scheme courts consider 
such factors as knowledge, amount of risk created by the con-
duct, degree of negligence, and overall circumstances. Causa-
tion is compared while not being the basis of liability, as 
CERCLA is a strict liability statute. The causation only deter-
mines what share the parties will bear. 
A modification of the pro rata and comparative causation 
schemes may be found in the proposed Gore Amendment to 
CERCLA. While the House of Representatives passed the 
amendment, it failed to pass the Senate and was subsequently 
dropped from CERCLA. The Gore Amendment would apportion 
liability with an eye to the furtherance of the goals of 
CERCLA. This amendment directed the court to look at the 
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volume and toxicity of the release as they relate to culpability. 
In United States v. R. W. Meyer, one finds that the district 
court used all of the methods mentioned above. The court com-
pared causation in the sense of the Gore Amendment, but at 
the same time finally ended with a purely pro rata share. As 
stated, Congress was concerned that parties who actually 
caused little of the release would bear burdens too great under 
the strict liability standard and the contribution scheme. How-
ever, the district court in Meyer supplies the reader with the 
basis as to why the outcome is fair and the final apportionment 
fully fulfills the goals of CERCLA. The district court achieves 
this through the recognition of the moral position of PRPs. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MORAL POSITION STANDARD 
A. The Moral Position of Contributors Under CERCLA 
The district court in Meyer stated that its decision to ap-
portion one-third of the total clean-up costs was based on the 
fact that Meyer did not cooperate with the EPA and that Meyer 
had a causative connection to the release since he had con-
structed the sewer through which the wastes were released. 72 
Additionally, the court stated that Meyer had a significant 
responsibility "simply by virtue of being the landowner.'>73It is 
mainly this conclusion which Meyer disputed on appeal. 
The Sixth Circuit stated likewise: "[T]he trial court quite 
properly considered here not only the appellant's [Meyer's] 
contribution to the toxic slough described above in a technical 
causative sense, but also its moral contribution as the owner of 
the site."74 The court reasoned that meticulous findings of 
causation were not warranted nor intended by Congress under 
CERCLA. Instead, the primary factors that a court should be 
concerned with are that the clean-up costs will be borne by 
those who are responsible, and that the public interest can be 
protected. 75 The moral contribution or position standard 
achieves this purpose by first assigning the costs to persons 
who, like Meyer, could have done something about the hazard-
ous substance release. The facts show that Meyer knew exactly 
what was going on. Second, in order to protect the public, the 
courts should adopt the moral position standard as a warning 
72. United States v. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 571 (1991). 
73. ld. 
74. Meyer, 932 F.2d at 573. 
75. ld. 
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to future landowners. 
Through the adoption of this standard, landowners will be 
less passive about watching questionable activities occur on 
their land, and they will understand that they may be liable for 
any environmental problems which may occur. They will make 
it their business to know what is taking place on their land. If 
an environmental catastrophe is averted through such a strict 
standard, then the objectives of CERCLA will have been 
achieved. 
The scope of CERCLA liability serves to encourage private 
remedial initiative as to existing sites, to discourage careless 
disposition of toxic wastes, and not least to ensure the vigi-
lance of those whose proximity to generators of toxic sub-
stances creates the potential for liability, who also occupy the 
most advantageous positions from which to monitor [genera-
tors].76 
The moral position standard is not completely new to 
CERCLA litigation; it is an extension of an emerging trend. 
When a landlord leases land to a tenant, both the landlord and 
the tenant are liable as possessors and owners of a "facility" 
under CERCLA.77 Courts have held that the landlord is liable 
even if the tenant is shown to be the sole cause of the re-
lease. 78 The knowledge or consent of the landlord is irrele-
vant. 79 One might reason that the landlord should have 
known about circumstances which would lead to CERCLA lia-
bility. 
A corollary of the moral position standard is found in the 
already well settled area of contribution from landowners who 
purchased the land after the release. To avoid liability, pur-
chasers must show that they did not know and had no reason 
to know that the property was contaminated. 80 A landowner 
who owned the land before the release should be expected to 
adhere to at least the same standard, if not a higher one. 
76. AM Int'l, Inc. v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. 
Ohio 1990) (emphasis added). 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, 
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1984). See note 32 supra at 11. 
78. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168-69 (4th Cir. 1988); Unit-
ed States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,616 (D.N.M. May 
4, 1984). 
79. !d. 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1988). 
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In United States v. Monsanto Co.,81 the landowners ver-
bally leased their property on a month-to-month basis. It was 
the lessor's understanding that the party to whom he leased 
the land would be using it for storing of raw materials and 
finished products. Later, the lessee began using the land as a 
facility for the disposal and storage of chemical wastes generat-
ed by third parties. 82 The landowners were unaware of this 
activity for several years.83 Eventually, an environmental 
problem surfaced which required a remedial action by the gov-
ernment. The landowners were held jointly and severally liable 
for the $1.8 million in clean-up costs.84 
The moral position standard simply demands a more nar-
row reading of the innocent landowner's defense as well as 
extending more responsibility to those who have owned prop-
erty for the entire period in question. The moral position 
should be compared with the provision that the landowner 
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance, 
and that he took precautions against the third party's foresee-
able acts.85 The due care that the landowner should be expect-
ed to exercise should include occasional personal observations 
of what occurs on his property. The landowner should also be 
imputed to have had the common sense to know that when a 
product is manufactured wastes are produced. The landowner, 
therefore, should be inquisitive as to what those wastes are 
and if he might be potentially liable in the future. 
Thus, through tightening the innocent landowner defense 
with the imposition of a moral position standard, PRPs will not 
stick their heads in the sand and hope for the best. Instead, 
they will be proactive in ensuring that their liability exposure 
is reduced. Some landowners may find through diligent effort 
that a release has already occurred, and while they might not 
be able to escape all liability, a landowner can at least mini-
mize his total liability. 
B. Reduction of Liability Exposure 
The landowners must accept the fact that the moral posi-
tion standard is a sign of an emerging trend acknowledging the 
81. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988). 
82. !d. at 164. 
83. !d. 
84. !d. 
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (198R). 
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inherent responsibility that landowners possess. The accep-
tance of this responsibility, coupled with the recognition that 
landowners are often the PRP the EPA first seeks out for com-
pensation, should prompt landowners to attempt to limit their 
liability. Exposure to liability can be reduced through attempt-
ing to contract out of the liability, seeking de minimis settle-
ments, and cooperating with the EPA. 
1. Limitations on Contracting Out of CERCLA Liability 
The court in Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C Music, Ltd., recog-
nized that parties can allocate environmental liability between 
themselves by contract.86 The court stated: 
Contractual arrangements apportioning CERCLA liabilities 
between private "responsible parties" are essentially tangen-
tial to the enforcement of CERCLA's liability provisions. Such 
agreements cannot alter or excuse the underlying liability, 
but can only change ultimately who pays that liability. More-
over, regardless of how or under what law these agreements 
are interpreted, the result cannot prejudice the right of the 
government to recover cleanup or closure costs from any re-
sponsible party .... 87 
The Ninth Circuit's holding reflects CERCLA section 
9607(e)(l),88 and has great import for the landowner as he is 
often the defendant of choice for the government and may have 
to front the clean-up costs until he can complete an action for 
contribution under CERCLA. 
A defense against a contribution action based on a contrac-
86. 804 F.2d 1454, 1458 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[A] uniform federal rule should not be 
developed to govern the issue of whether and when agreements between private 
'responsible parties' can settle disputes over contribution rights under section 107 
[§ 9607]."). !d. 
87. !d. at 1459. Accord Smith Land & Improv. Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 
86, 89 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1988); Channel Master Satellite 
Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elecs. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1231 (E.D.N.C. 1988). 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) states: 
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance 
shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or 
facility or from any person who may be liable for a release or threat of 
release under this section, to any other person the liability imposed under 
this section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure, 
hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability 
under this section. 
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tual agreement will only be upheld if the parties' intent to 
preclude assertion of statutory rights is clear and unambigu-
ous.89 The applicable law, however, will be the state law appli-
cable to the contract at issue. Therefore, effectively contracting 
allocation of potential liabilities varies depending on jurisdic-
tion. 
Contractual agreements which can be construed narrowly 
will not preclude CERCLA liability where it is not clearly the 
intent of the parties.90 In Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, 
Inc.,91 an express indemnity clause limited all liability for two 
years. While holding that parties can contract out of CERCLA 
liability, the court held that the clause in this case did not 
preclude liability under CERCLA because the clause was not 
specific enough as to environmentalliability.92 
Thus, landowners who attempt to allocate CERCLA liabili-
ty in contracts, such as leases, should be specific in their alloca-
tion. In view of the fact that the government may sue them 
first, landowners should consider the possibility that the in-
demnity clause will do them no good if the party with whom 
they contracted is insolvent or non-existent when the hazard-
ous situation is discovered. Therefore, landowners should be 
prepared to limit their liabilities in other ways. 
2. De Minimis Settlements for PRP Landowners 
Congress acknowledged that some PRPs would be unfairly 
burdened if they were forced to assume large portions of lia-
bility under CERCLA's strict liability scheme. Pursuant to 
section 122(g)(l) of SARA,93 individuals may qualify as de mi-
nimis waste contributors. The EPA is given authority to enter 
into negotiations with de minimis contributors in an attempt to 
reach an equitable settlement. 
In the typical de minimis settlement, the settling parties, in 
exchange for a payment, will receive statutory contribution 
protection under section 122(g)(5)94 of SARA and may be 
granted a covenant not to sue where such a covenant is con-
89. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1461. 
90. Channel Master Satellite Sys., 702 F. Supp. at 1231 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (in-
demnification clause did not apply to violations of federal law). 
91. 696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988). 
92. ld. at 1002. 
93. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(l) (1988). 
94. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5) (1988). 
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sistent with the public interest under section 122(g)(2).95 
For those landowners who find themselves liable, but who 
can show that they have fulfilled many of the requirements 
that they would need to assert a valid innocent landowner 
defense, a de minimis settlement often is the best avenue for 
limiting liability. As the first party which the EPA will sue to 
pay for a remedial action, many legal costs can be saved by 
entering into negotiations with the EPA. Refusing to make a de 
minimis settlement also opens the landowner up for large 
amounts of liability. If the interest of the landowner is to mini-
mize liability exposure, then a de minimis settlement is almost 
always the best alternative. 
3. Cooperation with the EPA Essential to Liability 
Minimization 
"PRPs who have been unresponsive to information requests 
or subpoenas generally should not be considered for de minimis 
settlements."96 It is never in the interest of a landowner to be 
uncooperative with the EPA. First, such behavior can obliterate 
any chances of entering into a de minimis settlement. Second, 
among the list of factors courts look at when apportioning lia-
bility in a contribution action is "the degree of cooperation by 
the parties with Federal, State, or local officials to prevent any 
harm to the public health or the environment."97 It can only 
hurt the landowner if he is uncooperative. 
Thus, through either contracting out ofliability, or seeking 
a de minimis settlement, exposure to massive liability can be 
reduced. At a minimum, cooperation with the EPA is essential. 
There are, of course, no guarantees that any efforts to reduce 
exposure will help lessen liability in a strict liability scheme 
considering the harm has already been adjudicated as joint and 
several. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Through the imposition of the moral position standard in 
analyzing potential landowner liability, courts like the Sixth 
Circuit in Meyer recognize the great influence landowners can 
95. Superfund Program: De Minimis Contributor Settlements, 52 Fed. Reg. 
24,334 (1987). 
96. ld. at n.2. 
97. See supra note 20. 
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have over environmental waste problems. The moral position 
evaluation lies well within the court's equitable powers and 
allows the court to achieve the goals intended by Congress in 
CERCLA. If landowners recognize the high standard to which 
they must conform, then they can act accordingly in preventing 
harm to the environment. At the same time, by being conscious 
of their obligation to the public to guard against the release of 
hazardous substances, landowners can limit their own liability 
exposure under CERCLA. 
David N. Mortensen 
